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ABSTRACT
This paper uses dynamic panel data methods to examine the determinants of bank’s performance in the German banking sector. The main determinants 
considered are indicators of solvency and liquidity, which makes it possible to observe the behavior of the banks in terms of risk before and during 
the financial crisis. The study is motivated by the hypothesis that the behavior of German banks depends on bank-specific variables which have an 
effect on loan policy of institutions. Universal banks in Germany can be divided into three main types of institutions: commercial, public-sector and 
cooperative banks. The analysis is conducted in a disaggregated manner by classifying the banks into main categories. Each category is examined 
separately so as to detect possible similarities or differences in the behavior of each panel on banks’ performance. The empirical analysis relates to a 
sample of 1624 German banks observed over the period 2000-2014.
Keywords: Banking Profitability, Financial Crisis, Financial Market Structure. 
JEL Classifications: D21, G21, E44, C23, G32, L25
1. INTRODUCTION
The financial deregulation and liberalization of the economies 
in the 20th century, has changed the role and the institutional 
forms of banks in most European countries. Historically, almost 
all European countries had a so-called “three pillar” banking 
system comprising private banks, savings banks and cooperative 
banks. Under the pressure of globalization of the financial 
systems to converge on liberal market financial practices, several 
European countries have implemented changes in their banking 
systems, which have affected the two “pillars” of the savings 
and cooperative banks. In some European countries, cooperative 
banks have completely disappeared as specific groups of financial 
institutions and in some others, there is a convergence of objectives 
with private banks suppressing the substantial difference between 
these banks and international commercial banks.
The structure of German banks is almost unique in Europe as the 
German savings banks and cooperative banks have maintained 
most of their traditional features. Germany financial system 
conforms to a coordinated market model characterized by higher 
levels of bank participation in firms. However a part of the 
German banks have also adapted his system under pressures of 
the international economy in the 1970s. Consequently, commercial 
banks gradually moved into investment banking and trading 
activities while reducing their links to the industrial sector. The 
private segment of the banking sector is actually dominated 
by 3 big banks: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and UniCredit 
controlling one third of all commercial banks assets which makes 
them systemically key banks. Traditionally, the big banks have 
acted as house banks to the larger German industrial enterprises 
providing long-term loans for investment. Currently, roughly 50 
per cent of the German banking sector consists of not-for-profit 
organizations. The bank business model put some pressure on 
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savings and cooperative banks, but they remained on their strong 
positions in the banking market as shown by Dilek et al. (2013).
Apart from the important role those savings banks and cooperative 
or mutual banks can play in several European banking systems, 
studying these two groups of banks is particularly interesting 
because of their unconventional organizational design in Germany, 
which sets them apart from private banks that solely operate in 
the interests of their shareholders. Moreover, under the influence 
of the financial crisis, and the experience of much bank failures, 
policy makers and regulators have adopted a skeptical view of 
the merits of private banks and are now trying to find ways of 
limiting their riskiness.
In this paper, we measure banks performance according to their 
specialization in order to analyze groups of banks and their 
disparities in determination of a bank performance. This procedure 
can improve managerial performance by identifying best and worst 
practices associated with high and low measured efficiency. In 
the practice, bank regulators screen banks by evaluating banks’ 
liquidity, solvency and overall performance in order to intervene 
when there is need and to gauge the potential for problems. We 
propose to use financial ratios of solvency and liquidity which 
makes it possible to observe the behavior of the banks in terms of 
risk before and during the last financial crisis. The data used in the 
empirical study is obtained from Bankscope, a regular financial 
database of Fitch, IBCA and Van Dijk desk. The sample includes 
annual financial data of 1624 German banks observed over the 
period 2000-2014. The sample is divided into multiple panel data 
sets by classifying the banks according to their specialization. 
Each category is examined separately so as to detect possible 
similarities or differences in the behavior (i.e. the determinants) 
of each panel on banks’ performance. The fact that all banks could 
not be included in the study constrains the validity of our analysis 
(Appendix A) particularly for the analysis of the commercial 
banks performance due to the lack of transparency in these 
data. However, as the private German banking system is highly 
concentrated, the three largest German banks (Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank, and UniCredit) may offer us a comprehensive 
analysis of some evolutions of this sector during the period. All the 
other banks specializations are relatively well enough informed.
2. DETERMINANTS FACTORS OF BANKS 
PERFORMANCE
Our sample is an unbalanced panel dataset of 1624 commercial 
banks, cooperative banks and saving banks in Germany over the 
years from 2000 to 2014 (Appendix B). Regarding the database, 
we eliminated 1% of the extreme observations. As a result we work 
with an unbalanced panel, but our results are much more stable.
In the Appendix B, we list the variables used in this study. The 
profitability variable is represented by two alternative measures: 
the ratio of the net return to total assets, (ROA), the ratio of the 
net return to the equity, (ROE). ROA has been used in most bank 
performance studies (for example Sufian, 2011). It measures 
the profit earned per Euro of assets and reflects how well bank 
management uses the banks’ real investment resources to generate 
profits. But this ratio does not take into account off balance sheet 
activities integrated in the results of the ROE ratio. Furthermore, 
we use an adjusted ROA, the return on average assets (ROAA), 
and an adjusted ROE (ROAE) respectively accounting for seasonal 
variations in assets or in equities during a fiscal year.
To identify potential size effects, we use total assets (TA) as an 
alternative size variable in our analyses. Indeed, one of important 
questions in the literature is which bank size maximizes bank 
profitability. Economic theory suggests that market structure 
affects firm performance since larger institutions could provide 
services at lower cost until diseconomies of scale set in. Literature 
has shown that the relationship between the bank size and 
profitability can be positive or negative (Staikouras and Wood, 
2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2010; 
Naceur and Omran, 2011).
We use the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) and the ratio of 
equity to net loans (EQNL) to proxy the capital variables. Capital 
is one of the bank specific variables that influence the level of 
bank profitability. Capital creates liquidity for the bank, reduces 
the chances of potential losses and protects the bank’s debtors. 
Capital adequacy ratio is an indicator of the internal strength of 
the bank to withstand losses during crisis. The ratio of equity on 
total assets measures the weight of the capital of the bank. This 
ratio estimates the funds’ repartition of banks between debts and 
own capital. Then it seems that a high level of capital adequacy 
is an indicator of low debts and consequently of lower risk of 
insolvency. In the literature some studies have shown positive 
relationship between capital and profitability such as Al-Jarrah 
et al. (2010); Ommeren (2011); Rao and Lakew (2012), Terraza 
(2015). A second ratio of capital measures the financial level of 
banks calculating the proportion of own capital on the debt which 
banks use to finance their loans. Loan is the major asset of banks 
from which they generate income and the quality of loan portfolio 
is one determinant of the profitability of banks and an indicator 
of bank liquidity, another factor that determines the level of bank 
performance. Liquidity refers to the bank’s ability to meet any and 
all necessary financial obligations, mainly of depositors.
Different studies have resorted to different proxies for liquidity 
including Bashir and Abdel-Hameed (2001), Hassan and Bashir 
(2003), and Alkassim (2005) where they found that the liquidity 
ratio has a significant impact on various measures of profitability. 
According to Dang (2011) adequate level of liquidity is positively 
related with bank profitability. Different financial ratios can be used 
to measure liquidity. The most common financial ratios that reflect 
the ability of banks to cover quickly short term-debs positions are 
net loans to total assets (NLTA) and total loans to customer deposits 
total (TLCDT). The NLTA ratio measures the debt amount of the 
bank as a percentage of total assets. This liquidity ratio indicates 
what percentage of the assets of the bank is tied up in loans. This 
ratio does not directly measure liquidity; it gives an indication of 
how much of the bank assets are tied into illiquid loans. The higher 
this ratio the less liquid the bank will be and the more risk a bank 
may be to higher defaults. This ratio can be interpreted as well as 
a measure of the risk of liquidity as the credit risk. An increased 
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exposure to credit risk is normally associated with decreased bank 
profitability and, hence, we expect a negative relationship between 
ROAA and the NLTA ratio. Another liquidity ratio is net loans-to-
deposits TLCDT. This ratio compares illiquid assets to their own 
financial source. This liquidity or funding ratio indicates to what 
extent the banks relatively illiquid loans are funded by relatively 
stable customer deposits rather than wholesale or market funding. 
Ideally this ratio should be below 100%. Indeed, the higher the 
TLCDT ratio is, the higher the dependence on non-deposit funding. 
Since deposits are viewed to be more stable and cheaper source of 
fundings, greater dependence may signal higher funding risks and 
higher riskiness for a bank. A range between 70- 90% of this ratio 
is seen as optimal (Golin and Delhaise, (2013)). Indeed, if the ratio 
is too high, it means that banks might not have enough liquidity 
to cover any unforeseen fund requirements; if the ratio is too low, 
banks may not be earning as much as they could be. This ratio is 
often used by policy makers to determine the lending practices of 
financial institutions. The liquid assets to total customer deposits 
and short term funding (LACUST) show the ability of a bank to 
meet its liabilities. The numerator is computed from all reserve 
assets of the banks. This ratio can be considered as a proxy for 
what percentage of customer deposits and short term funding could 
be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. The higher the ratio is, 
the more liquid the bank is to repay its short term liabilities with 
the liquid assets from its balance sheet. Consequently, we can 
expect a positive sign for the coefficients of this variable in the 
determination of the bank profitability.
These last years the capacity of an establishment to increase net 
loans to customer deposits was considered by the analysts, as 
an important criterion of banks performance. The consequence 
was the slowdown of banks deposits in order to develop off 
balance sheet activities and the use of leverage effects investing 
in securities to generate additional profits. The advantage of this 
strategy is the option of by passing limits fixed by the regulators, 
the possibility to avoid accumulation of capital and the potential 
reduction of customer deposits. In this paper, we use the ratio 
defined as the Off-balance sheet items divided by off-balance 
sheet items plus total assets (OFFBAL) in order to measure the 
importance of liabilities off balance sheets compared to the whole 
activity of the bank. Goddard et al. (2004) tested the effect of this 
ratio on the profitability of the European and American banks 
and they found that the coefficient of regression is negative for 
Germany but it’s positive for England. For other countries, the 
coefficients are not significant.
The suppression of some outliers can give a non-integer number 
of banks.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
our analyses. On average, the banks in our sample have a ROAA 
of 0.29%, a ROAE of 4.17%. The difference between mean and 
quartiles for all ratios indicates that there exist large profitability 
differences among the banks in our sample. On average, the 
capitalization of banks is 7.18%, which, however, differs among 
banks. The quartiles show that on average the vast majority of 
banks are below the 8% supervision requirement during the whole 
period: 75% of banks have a ratio lower than 7.90. However 
we observe some significant differences between the results of 
the different time periods: we observe an upward trend since 
2004 and from 2011 the capital ratio is in average above the 8% 
supervision requirement for all banks (Table 1 in Appendix C). 
The results differ also according to the specialization of banks. 
The ratio of commercial bank is always higher than 11% for the 
entire period while until 2011, Cooperative and saving banks 
are low capitalized banks (Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix C). The 
credit risk ratio measured by the ratio of the net loans to total 
assets (NLTA), amounts to 58.23% which indicates on average, a 
relatively low level of liquidity among the banks in our sample with 
respect to this variable. The second measure of liquidity confirms 
the previous result. The ratio of LACUST amounts to 17.40% 
on average and the median is quite similar. Finally, the credit 
ratio to deposits (TLCDT) compares illiquid assets from its own 
source of income. As pointed out above, in average, a substantial 
part of the total income of the banks in our sample stems from 
illiquid operations. In order to better explain the origin of income, 
the last ratio despites off balance sheet activities in accordance 
with the whole activities of banks. As observed this ratio is quite 
low compared to the current trend. To see in detail the behavior 
of banks during the period, we observe the average of the ratios 
estimated each year (Table 3 in Appendix C). Figure 1 examine 
the profitability performance of banks during the period 2000-
2014. Profitability is measured in terms of ROAA, and return on 
average equity (ROAE).
From 2000 to 2004, banks’ profitability measured by the ROAA 
ratio is relatively stable around 0.25% before attempt more than 
0.30% from 2005. It shows that prior the crisis period of 2008, 
the ROAA ratio was usually higher than 0.3% but in a decrease 
tendency to attempt 0.2% at the time crisis period. After the 2008 
crisis, the ratio has increased from 2009 to 2010, but without on 
average recovers the level of 2005 and since 2011, the downward 
trend continues. A similar trend is observed for the ROAE 
ratio. From 2011 however, the rate of return to shareholders 
slightly decline to attempt 3.91% in 2012. This indicates that the 
banks significantly progressed in profitability only during the 
periods of 2004-2005 and 2009-2010. We lead specific analysis 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Mean 0.29 4.17 4435244.28 7.18 14.94 58.23 17.40 229.08 5.52
Quartile1 0.14 2.39 222100.00 5.12 8.48 51.09 8.85 67.41 3.15
Median 0.23 3.71 529500.00 6.27 10.75 60.16 13.71 82.45 4.54
Quartile3 0.35 5.41 1306100.00 7.90 14.13 67.53 20.12 98.08 6.49
Std. 0.39 2.81 64327572.3 5.95 36.96 14.57 24.92 3026.57 5.20
Min. −8.24 −9.85 322.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.81
Max. 9.68 18.35 2587312000 100.00 985.42 99.97 926.58 124160 93.86
Number of banks 1371.8 1349 1375.8 1375.8 1369.06 1374.4 1372.2 1369.1 1352
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by classifying banks into categories. Table 3 in Appendix C 
compare the profitability measures according different groups 
of banks in order to examine whether performance is specialties 
dependent. Figure 2a below show the trend of ROAA and ROAE 
by specialization (ROAAsp and ROAEsp).
As mentioned above, performance strongly declined in 2008 for 
all specialties may be because of the effect of the global economic 
crisis and its effect on the domestic one. Again performance 
improved in 2010 after the recovery. However commercial banks 
performance exhibits an erratic and downward trend in the study 
period suggesting that the pricing ability of commercial banks 
was generally lower in recent years than previously. We observe 
that cooperative and saving banks exhibit a lower profitability 
than commercial private banks but since 2009 the gap between 
cooperative banks and commercial banks has narrowed for the 
benefit of cooperative banks. Then, on average the performance 
of cooperative banks in the country has been increasing compared 
to the financial performances of our commercial banks sample. 
This shows that investments in cooperative banking in Germany 
have been profitable and it is an avenue to attract foreign direct 
investment. To explain the evolution of the ratio for commercial 
banks, we show the evolution of the ratios for the 3 biggest 
banks in Germany. We observe from Figure 2b that the effects 
of the crisis are more pronounced with a negative ratio of their 
performance during the two crisis period: In 2003 the ROAA for 
UniCredit is −0.48 while for Commerzbank is −0.55 and in 2009 
this ratio attempts −0.63 for Commerzbank. The more volatility 
of these banks is well reflected showing sharp strike and big drops 
in performance during the period.
To better understand these shapes, first we observe the evolution of 
total assets of banks during the period. Figure 3 show the upward 
trend of total assets of commercial banks sector before the crisis 
from 2006 until 2008 and small decline after. If cooperative banks 
remain relatively constant in their evolution of total assets, saving 
Figure 1: Profitability measures
Figure 2a: Profitability measures of different groups
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banks earn a relatively big share of income of total assets since 
2009 compared to cooperative banks. On the second Figure 3 
below, we observe the evolution of total assets of the 3 biggest 
banks. Deutsche Bank is one of the largest banks. In 2014, their 
total assets amounted to approximately 1.7 billion euros, to 
558 million euros for Commerzbank and 300 million euros for 
UniCredit.
From the previous results, we notice that the performance ratio 
of commercial banks measured by the ROAA decreases passing 
from 0.69 in 2006 to 0.31 in 2014 while in the same time the total 
assets progress heavily from 2005 until the crisis and remains 
more or less stable from 2008. Then a second analysis will be to 
compare the structure of banks incomes using the equity multiplier 
(EM) defined as total assets divided by common equity. This ratio 
represents the degree of financial leverage of a bank estimating 
which assets are funded with equity relative to debt. Table 2 
reports the equity multiplier and compares its values with those 
of the EQTA ratio during the whole period for all groups of banks.
From Table 2, we observe that EM is higher for cooperative and 
saving banks than for the commercial banks due to a lower amount 
of capital generated by this category of banks. By decreasing equity, 
a bank can increase ROAE based on any given level of ROAA but 
can also decrease ROAA for a given level of ROAE1. From 2008, 
1 The ROAA times the equity multiplier yields the ROAE. This equation is 
referred to as the Extended Du Pont Equation.
Figure 2b: Profitability measures of the biggest commercial banks
Figure 3: Total assets of different groups
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the economic tendency is to increase capital of banks in order 
to maintain efficiency and profitability performance. The trend 
reflected by ROAA is then reflected in the equity multiplier. The 
EM ratio has continued to fall at a decreasing rate for commercial 
banks, indicating a decrease of 14.41% in 2014 compared to 2008 
and a decrease of 22.64% compared to 2002. The decline in the 
EM ratio is as a result of capital levels which have significantly 
improved. However, all specialties of banks suffered bank 
performance decreases from 2005. Commercial banks have known 
an increase in profitability from 0.35% in 2008 to 0.59% in 2010 
before falling to 0.31% in 2014. One explication of the highest ratio 
for commercial banks’ profitability compared with the other banks 
specialties during the period is also probably due to strong decrease 
in the EM ratio as a result of capital levels. In contrast, among the 
different banks specialties, saving banks have experienced the 
higher leverage and stayed at a lower level of profitability around 
0.2% during the whole period. During a crisis, poor asset quality 
and low levels of liquidity are the two major causes which may 
bank failures. Then banks may decide to diversify their portfolios 
and or raise their liquid holdings in order to reduce their risk. To 
verify these features, credit risk and liquidity ratio are represented 
below differencing the category of banks (Table 2 in Appendix C).
Figure 4a show the rate of average liquidity in terms of net loan 
to total assets ratio (NLTA), total loans to customer total deposit 
(TLCDT) and liquid assets to total customer deposits and short 
term funding (LACUST). We observe that on average, liquidity 
ratios are relatively low for all categories of banks. Liquidity levels 
have been slightly falling during the period but contracted most 
between the years 2009-2010 as the result of the financial crisis. 
The ratio of net loans to total assets does not directly measure 
liquidity; it gives an indication of how much of the bank assets 
are tied into illiquid loans. A level upside of 50% suggests an 
increase in loan provisions of all banks which induce a reduction 
of the amount of available liquidity. Generally, a higher NLTA may 
indicate possible liquidity problems for banks which are confirmed 
by the estimation of the LACUST ratio under 20% for cooperative 
and saving banks. This ratio is enhanced (49.1%) for commercial 
banks but it remains under 50%. A loan-to-deposit ratio inferior 
to 100% can indicate that banks have cash enough on hand for 
contingencies which is the case for cooperative banks with a ratio 
around 80% and for commercial banks with a ratio of 94.91%. For 
these banks it’s a good benchmark in order to combining prudence 
and regulatory requirements. Finally, commercial banks present the 
highest level of liquidity then the other groups of bank specialties.
Since this banking sector is very concentrated, we compare 
the evolution of the mean of liquidity ratios of our sample 
of commercial banks to the 3 biggest banks of the sector 
(Appendix D and Figure 4b). We observe an upward trend of the 
NLTA ratio until the crisis, a sudden drop with the crisis and an 
increase of the ratio afterwards more pronounced for Deutsche 
bank passing from around 12% in 2008 to 24% in 2014. In general, 
we observe a lower ratio for the biggest banks during the period 
compared with the mean ratio of commercial banks. This tendency 
is more pronounced for the Deutsche bank knowing a low amount 
in loan provisions during the period confirmed by the low level 
of the TLCDT ratio. The change in the trend signifies the slowing 
down in net loans indicating a fall in the amount of customer and 
short term funds. For Commerzbank and UniCredit, the TLCDT 
ratio has been gradually falling during the period from 208.53% 
in 2006 to 107.85 in 2012 for Commerzbank, for example. In 
terms of the degree of capital adequacy, while the capital ratio is 
above 8% in mean for commercial banks, this ratio is just around 
4% in average for Commerzbank and UniCredit but under 3% in 
mean for the Deutsche bank which is largely inferior to the capital 
Table 2: Financial leverage of banks
Year EM_Sp1 EM_Sp2 EM_Sp3 EQTA_Sp1 EQTA_Sp2 EQTA_Sp3
2000 7.21 18.64 22.28 13.87 5.37 4.49
2001 8.88 18.68 21.95 11.27 5.35 4.56
2002 8.17 18.07 21.32 12.24 5.53 4.69
2003 7.69 17.67 20.53 13.00 5.66 4.87
2004 7.29 17.12 19.65 13.71 5.84 5.09
2005 8.29 15.48 18.45 12.07 6.46 5.42
2006 7.17 14.73 17.86 13.95 6.79 5.60
2007 6.82 14.56 17.64 14.67 6.87 5.67
2008 7.39 14.93 17.76 13.54 6.70 5.63
2009 7.45 14.75 16.72 13.43 6.78 5.98
2010 6.57 14.16 15.63 15.21 7.06 6.40
2011 6.57 13.21 13.07 15.23 7.57 7.65
2012 6.08 12.32 12.18 16.45 8.12 8.21
2013 6.20 11.49 11.51 16.13 8.70 8.69
2014 6.32 11.06 10.89 15.82 9.04 9.18
Mean 7.21 15.12 17.16 14.04 6.79 6.14
Figure 4a: Liquidity ratios of different groups
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requirement. As a consequence, a large disparity appears between 
commercial banks in Germany according to their exposition to 
credit risk. The 3 biggest are the primary contributors to liquidity 
creation but a question remains concerning the efficiency of the 
prudential mechanism, in particular we observe that the relation 
between bank capital and liquidity creation seems to be not 
pertinent for these banks.
Indeed, banks liquidity needs depend significantly on the balance-
sheet structure, product mix, and cash flow profiles of both on- and 
off-balance-sheet obligations. The German corporatist structure 
relies much more on banks for financing rather than the securities 
markets that dominate the U.S. and British systems.
Figure 5 confirm this result giving the part concerning off balance 
sheet activities of banks on the global activities. Large banks have 
a different performance in terms of risk and return outcomes. 
Commercial banks can more easily operate on the international 
markets and then can obtain a larger share of their income in the 
form of trading income and fees. Furthermore, large banks held a 
relatively small share of their assets in the form of loans rather than, 
for instance, securities, and they attract a relatively large share of 
their short-term funding in the form of non-deposit or wholesale 
funding. Obviously, cooperative and saving banks can be also 
large banks but German corporatist practices are centered on the 
German mentality of shareholders as stakeholders rather than 
outsider investors. The shares of German companies are not widely 
distributed compared to the broad distribution of company stocks 
held by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, private 
institutions, and individuals in some other European countries. 
In contrast, Most of commercial banks depend more heavily 
on wholesale funding markets than on the retail depositors see 
Figure 4 on the left below. Wholesale funding sources are usually 
less stable and have higher volatility. On the second Figure 4 on 
Figure 4b: Evolution of liquidity and solvability ratios of the biggest commercial banks
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the right, it appears that the ratio of the 3 biggest banks is very 
low comparing with the ratio of commercial banks in our sample. 
Indeed, the ratio is under 20% during the period and even under 
1% for the Deutsche bank in 2008. Surprisingly, it seems that off 
balance sheet represents a small proportion of the global activity 
of the three biggest banks. We think that this conclusion may be 
taken with caution because of the lack of transparency due to the 
nature of this ratio.
3. MODEL AND DATA
Following the recent literature in panel data studies (e.g. Salas 
and Saurina (2002), Merkl and Stolz (2009) on banking related 
studies, Calderón and Chong (2001), Cheng and Kwan (2000), 
Beck and Levine (2004), Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) 
and Carstensen and Toubal (2004) on macroeconomic studies), 
a dynamic approach is adopted in order to account for the time 
persistence in the performance structure:
1 , ,0
1, , ; 1, ,
J
it it j i t j i tJ
Y Y X u i N t T − −== + + = =∑    (1)
with uit=μi+λt+νit, where 
Where Y (respectively ROAA, ROAE), the endogenous variable, 
is bank ratio of performance. The subscript i denotes the bank 
and t denotes the time period. u is the error term of the model, 
μ and λ are respectively bank and time specific effects. Yit-1 
represent the one period lagged dependent performance of bank 
i., βj is the vector of coefficients to be estimated, Xi the vector 
of explanatory variables. Six bank characteristic indicators are 
used as internal determinants of performance. They include the 
total assets (TA), the ratio of EQTA, the ratio of equity to total 
loans (EQNL), a credit risk ratio defined as net loans to total 
assets (NLTA), the liquidity risk defined as liquid assets to 
customer deposits and short term fundings (LACUST) and the 
ratio total loans to customer deposit total (TLCDT). is the speed 
of adjustment to equilibrium. A value of between 0 and 1 implies 
that profitability persists. A value of γ close to 0 means that the 
market is fairly competitive. A value of γ close to 1 implies a 
less competitive structure.
To estimate our dynamic panel data model, we use the system-
GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell 
et al., 2001). This method uses a set of instrumental variables 
to solve the endogeneity problem arising from the potential 
correlation between the error term and the independent variable in 
dynamic panel data models (Topcu, 2013). The set of instruments 
includes all the available lags in difference of the endogenous 
variables and the strictly exogenous regressors (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991), but also the lagged values of the dependent variable. 
Dynamic panel data models, with unobserved individual- specific 
heterogeneity, have been widely used. Several estimators have 
been used for estimating the parameters in such dynamic models. 
A standard estimation procedure is to first-difference the model, 
so as to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity, and use moment 
conditions where endogenous differences of the variables are 
instrumented by their lagged levels. This corresponds to the first-
difference (DIF-)GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
However, the DIF-GMM estimator was found to be ineffcient 
since it does not utilize all available moment conditions (Ahn and 
Schmidt, 1995). Moreover, it has poor finite sample properties 
in dynamic panel data models with highly autoregressive series 
and a small number of time series observations (Alonso-Borrego 
and Arellano, 1999; Blundell and Bond, 1998): In those cases the 
instruments become less informative. To improve the performance 
of the estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed taking into 
consideration extra moment conditions from the level equation that 
rely on certain restrictions on the initial observations, as suggested 
by Arellano and Bover (1995). The resulting SYS-GMM estimator 
has been shown to perform much better than the DIF-GMM 
estimator in terms of finite sample bias and mean squared error, as 
well as with regard to coeffcient estimator standard errors since the 
Figure 5: Evolution of the off balance sheet ratio for the different groups
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instruments used for the level equation is still informative as the 
autoregressive coeffcient approaches unity (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). However, it was pointed out later on, (Hayakawa, 2007; 
Bun and Windmeijer, 2010), that the weak instruments problem 
still remains in the SYS-GMM estimator.
We estimate our model over the entire time period from 2000 to 
2014. The results’s instability has led to us to introduce additive 
time effects in the regression2, which turned out significant, 
translating the importance of the time dimension over the studied 
period. In many studies, a time effect is included to represent an 
aggregate shock that is common to all the cross-section units. In 
order to better investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis 
on the determinants of banking profitability, we then split up 
the sample into three time periods, namely the first crisis period 
ranging from 2000 to 2004, the 2008 crisis period from 2005 to 
2009 and post-crisis period from 2010 to 2014.
To verify the consistency of the GMM estimator, we consider the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. This test examines the null 
hypothesis of no order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals. We test second-order correlation AR(2), which should 
accept the null hypothesis. If not, it would mean that lags of the 
dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments 
that are not strictly exogenous) are in fine endogenous, and thus bad 
instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). But this case is rejected 
by the test for AR(2) errors for our regressions.
Estimation results are given from Tables 3a and b & 4a and b. Our 
lagged dependent variables which measure the degree of persistence 
of our profitability measures ROAA, ROAE are statistically 
significant across all models, indicating a high degree of 
persistence of bank profitability and justifying the use of dynamic 
models. Overall, we observe some significant differences between 
the estimation results of the different time periods, and according 
the specialization of banks both with respect to the significance 
and the size of the coefficients.
2 Note that “the asymptotic bias of the fixed effect estimator in the linear 
dynamic panel regression model is sourced in the presence of the individual 
effect not the presence of the time effect when these components enter the 
model in an additive and separable form” (Hyungsik et al., 2015).
As observed, for the whole period, linear measures of total 
assets show a general positive trend but it seems that total assets 
have no impact on profitability of all types of banks. To test the 
robustness of the results, we observe the impact of the variable 
according the different time period considered. For commercial 
banks a size profit relationship appears. More precisely, we 
observe a downward trend or a relative stability of total assets 
over the period 2000-2001 and in the same time an increase of the 
equity multiplier of the banks due to a low level of bank capital 
(Appendix C Table 3). The result is a positive relation between 
the profitability and total assets during this period. From 2005, TA 
progresses, knows high levels and respectively ROAA and ROAE 
achieve the outstanding level of 0.69% and 8.44% respectively 
in 2006. From 2008, however, the two variables fall below 2005 
level: The equity multiplier of the banks decreases due to a 
decrease in total assets. It explains the negative relation observed 
between total assets and ROAA during the 2008 crisis period for 
commercial banks. For cooperative and saving banks, no explicit 
relation appears between total assets and profitability measures.
The capital ratio (EQTA) has a positive and significant effect 
on bank profitability as measured by ROAA and ROAE for 
cooperative banks for all different time period. The capital 
adequacy ratio has a more pronounced impact on shareholders 
return during the financial crisis period (1.11). A high capital 
adequacy may reduce the risks of the cooperative banks, but, in 
the same time, the shareholders do not benefit from the leverage 
effect. Comparing to ROAE, the ROAA takes into account the 
risks derived from the leverage and during the crisis period the 
effect of the solvency is positive but weaker (0.19) for cooperative 
banks. For saving banks, the ratio has a negative impact on 
ROAA during the 2010-2014 due to an important augmentation 
of total assets of these banks and a positive impact on ROAE on 
the 2000-2004 periods due to a low level on capital. Concerning, 
commercial banks, the capital ratio has a negative and significant 
effect on bank profitability during the financial crisis 2007-2009. 
Indeed, commercial banks don’t be able to convert their amount 
of deposits into higher income earnings as the demand for lending 
decrease during this period.
The EQNL capital ratio affects positively and significantly 
the profitability of saving banks in any time period. Indeed, 
Table 3a: Estimation results for the whole period (ROAA dependent variable)
ROAA 2000-2014
All Sp1 Sp2 Sp3
L.ROAA 0.139 (0.017) 0.11 (0.024) 0.111 (0.008) 0.21 (0.019)
EQTA 0.023 (0.004) 0.094 (0.006) 0.021 (0.011)
EQLN 0.017 (0.004)
L.EQLN 0.0012 (0.0003) −0.035 (0.003)
NLTA −0.0022 (0.0012) −0.007 (0.001)
L.LACUST 0.0014 (0.0004) 0.0015 (0.0005) 0.0008 (0.0003)
TLCDT 0.0008 (0.0003)
L.OFFBAL 0.011 (0.004) 0.0008 (0.0004)
C1 0.18 (0.078) 0.45 (0.053) −0.35 (0.07)
AR(2) test* 0.22 0.72 0.45 0.042
nobs (%) 6.06 61.77 32.17
To compensate the standard error downward bias associated to the two-step SYS-GMM estimator, we apply the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by 
Windmeijer (2005). Standard errors are in brackets. *Arellano-Bond test. An “L.” in front of a variable means one lag of this variable. 1Note that including a constant does not impact the 
other parameter estimates since it is identified only by the level errors
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profitability of saving banks is strongly dependent of the amount 
of total loans provisions.
As expected, credit risk measured by NLTA is negatively and 
significantly related to bank profitability measures. This shows 
that in the German banking system managers, cooperative banks 
seem to have adopted a risk-averse strategy, mainly through 
policies that improve screening and monitoring credit risk. There 
is also empirical evidence that liquidity, measured by TLCDT, 
positively affects ROAE of cooperative and saving banks from 
the second sub-period. Indeed, from 2008, loan provisions have 
significantly increased during the crisis. However, a ratio raised 
for these banks does not mean the insufficiency of the deposits 
with regard to the credits, but rather the importance in volume of 
the credits given by these banks. The hypothesis, according to 
which the cooperative banks are rather specialized in retail banking 
by financing widely by liquid assets, is so verified. The variable 
TLCDT, have no impact on profitability of German commercial 
banks. Indeed, total loans are associated with decreased large bank 
profitability and, hence higher provisions usually indicate higher 
probability of non-performing ratios and lower asset quality. Then, 
higher liquidity would be associated with lower profitability for 
commercial banks. This explains why commercial banks suffer 
from the lack of provisions to cover expected credit losses over 
the crisis period (2008-2009). After the crisis the ratio declines 
but without reaching the 100% level as for the other specialties 
of banks.
The variable LACUST have a statistically significant effect on 
banks profitability essentially during the last sub-sample. This 
means that after the crisis period banks are be able to cope with 
long term liquidity and has less risk exposure, this positively 
impact the ROAE and thus the financial performance of the bank. 
We observe also a positive impact of this variable on the ROAA of 
banks. In the financial system, good funding liquidity may allow 
to increase trading activities of banks, which in turn can improve 
market liquidity. Conversely, tightened funding liquidity dissuades 
capital-constrained investors from taking positions, adversely 
affecting market liquidity. German bank’s funding source depends 
on the bank’s business model. Commercial or private banks have 
become stock market corporations and have developed intensive 
trading activities.
We observe that the variable OFFBAL have a significant and 
positive effect on the commercial bank ROAA ratio before and 
after the crisis periods. This means that off balance sheet activities 
could improve the profitability of banks but also increase the level 
of liabilities. During the crisis period, the variable has a positive 
impact on ROAE. It seems that financial strategies have been able 
to artificially maintain a healthy ROAE, growing debt average and 
hide deteriorating performance in business fundamentals.
Since a bank’s business model typically implies a high level of 
debt, these sources of risky investments coupled with very low 
loan provisions before the financial crisis explain the significant 
losses of commercial banks during the crisis period. The ratio has 
also a positive impact on cooperative banks during the crisis but in 
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Saving and cooperative banks, meanwhile due to a rather prudent 
business model, have been able to extend their share of income 
despite owning the small part of total banking assets.
4. CONCLUSION
The ROAE and the return of average assets of German banks are 
studied to identify key determinants that correlate with banking 
performance as the dependent variables. Most investors tend 
to focus on return on equity as their primary measure of bank 
performance as ROAE focuses on return to the shareholders of 
a bank. As financial strategies can artificially maintain a high 
level of ROAE, this metric to estimate the performance of a bank 
is interesting but insufficient. Comparing to ROAE, the use of 
ROAA takes into account the risks derived from the leverage and 
is considered as the key bank profitability ratio. However ROA 
doesn’t take into account the off-balance-sheet assets, which 
represent an important source of profit for European banks.
This paper analyses the main factors of solvency and liquidity and 
their impact on bank performance over the period 2000-2014 in 
the German banking system. The structure of German banks is 
almost unique in Europe separating the institutions according their 
principal funding sources and their activities. In all the sub-periods, 
the capital ratio EQTA has a positive impact on the profitability 
measures of cooperative banks while it’s the capital ratio EQLN 
which has a positive impact on the profitability measures of 
saving banks. This is due to the traditional business activities of 
these banks concentrating on the core-business of banking and 
corresponds to their mission and tradition. For commercial banks, 
before the crisis, capital ratios EQLN or EQTA have a significant 
and positive impact on profitability measures but during the crisis 
these ratios have a negative or inexistent impact on profitability 
measure showing the incapacity of commercial banks to convert 
their amount of deposits into higher income during this period. 
In the same time, the percentage of customer deposits and short 
term funding which provide funding reserve of liquidity have 
no impact on profitability before and during the crisis except for 
cooperative banks during the crisis. The funding ratio TLCDT 
has a positive impact on the return on equity for cooperative 
and saving banks during the crisis period while a significant and 
positive relationship between the ROAA ratio and off balance 
sheet activities is observed for commercial banks before and 
after the crisis. This behavior of commercial banks may result 
from speculative action by banks in generating higher earnings. 
This could indirectly result in higher risk associated with the use 
of such products. It has become apparent that commercial banks 
have known larger risks. Nevertheless, a huge amount of total 
assets conjured with a low level of capital suggest a high level of 
liabilities for the 3 biggest banks in Germany. This mechanism 
of more debt to get more competitiveness represents one cause 
of the fragility of the international financial system. This should 
be an important preoccupation for the regularly authorities and 
concern the future of stability of the financial system.
In contrast, German savings and cooperative banks managed to 
remain relatively stable and profitable during the crisis years. 
The diversity in the German banking system in which private, 
public and cooperative banks co-exist, a feature that was prevalent 
in the banking systems of most European countries, proved 
very effective during the financial crisis. One consequence of 
deregulation has resulted from the mixing of investment and 
commercial banking and many regulators have then proposed 
reforms to limit speculation and investment banking activities 
by commercial banks. But do the limits will be appropriate and 
sufficient or as during the great depreciation of 1929 the next step 
will be antitrust legislations?
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Appendix B: List of banks and list of variables
Banks by specialty Number
Commercial banks Sp1 518
Cooperative banks Sp2 970
Saving banks Sp3 136
Variables Description
Profitability measures 
ROAA Return on average assets




EQTA Equity to total assets
EQNL Equity to net loans
Liquidity measures 
NLTA Net loans to total assets
LACUST Liquid assets to customer deposits and 
short term funding
TLCDT Total loans to customer deposit total
Off-balance sheets items
OFFBAL Off-balance sheet items divided by 
off-balance sheet items plus total assets
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Structure of the German banking system
Universal Banks

















Branch Offices of 
Foreign Banks
(number: 111)
Source: Faltermeier (2012) (Bundesbank report 2012)
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of financial ratios
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000
Mean 0.247 4.89 2074476.16 5.65 12.35 62.02 15.53 130.69 5.78
Quartile 1 0.15 3.19 212450.00 4.27 6.76 56.85 8.16 77.90 3.27
Median 0.23 4.86 446300.00 4.97 7.82 64.36 12.00 92.97 4.59
Quartile 3 0.32 6.39 1104550.00 5.71 9.30 70.80 17.10 107.73 6.53
Std. 0.43 3.02 24300473.08 5.58 45.97 13.78 22.47 854.44 5.05
Min. −1.77 −9.23 11600.00 2.09 3.97 0.14 0.06 3.64 0.00
Max. 9.68 18.35 694267000 99.96 900.00 99.93 590.76 28033.33 81.39
Banks 1197 1158 1199 1199 1195 1199 1198 1196 1185
2001
Mean 0.248 4.72 2200817.00 5.47 10.83 60.83 16.75 134.37 5.44
Quartile 1 0.15 3.05 233500.00 4.27 6.89 55.01 9.53 74.10 3.00
Median 0.22 4.55 491300.00 4.99 7.97 63.02 13.27 89.04 4.30
Quartile 3 0.32 6.12 1174000.00 5.74 9.69 69.33 18.85 104.20 6.13
Std. 0.30 2.76 25698402.51 4.32 24.41 13.28 20.83 1006.41 4.91
Min. −2.43 −9.75 12400.00 2.18 3.91 0.70 0.08 7.44 0.00
Max. 4.00 18.24 716241000 100.00 558.88 99.89 576.16 31126.09 81.11
Banks 1186 1164 1189 1189 1187 1189 1188 1186 1166
2002
Mean 0.247 4.603 2100852.795 5.684 11.848 60.300 17.341 221.032 5.353
Quartile 1 0.13 2.72 257350.00 4.42 7.17 54.54 9.65 72.53 3.00
Median 0.22 4.28 541350.00 5.12 8.31 62.30 13.94 87.34 4.10
Quartile3 0.32 5.93 1244875.00 5.93 10.03 68.48 19.62 102.33 5.93
Std. 0.32 2.90 20347842.45 4.90 31.99 13.47 22.49 2428.89 5.08
Min. −5.70 −9.85 12500.00 2.10 3.07 0.79 0.07 0.95 0.01
Max. 3.81 18.21 526452000 100.00 775.74 99.90 494.29 67480.00 80.73
Banks 1168 1149 1172 1172 1170 1172 1171 1169 1142
2003
Mean 0.23 4.30 2183028.10 5.88 11.33 60.34 16.21 174.10 5.51
Quartile 1 0.13 2.52 288800.00 4.56 7.30 54.38 8.25 71.94 3.13
Median 0.22 4.16 580100.00 5.27 8.61 62.19 12.78 86.86 4.38
Quartile3 0.31 5.57 1305500.00 6.05 10.31 69.12 18.78 101.68 6.21
Std. 0.28 2.74 18753477.87 5.10 26.70 13.80 21.41 1725.07 5.18
Min. −3.38 −9.77 1407.60 1.22 2.89 0.37 0.00 6.58 0.01
Max. 3.19 18.32 473167000 98.79 735.00 99.85 499.32 51885.71 80.19
Banks 1136 1123 1141 1141 1137 1141 1140 1137 1105
2004
Mean 0.26 4.47 2318231.79 6.13 13.08 59.24 17.31 189.33 4.96
Quartile 1 0.14 2.84 290200.00 4.68 7.68 53.01 8.77 70.29 2.82
Median 0.23 4.32 587200.00 5.41 9.00 61.41 13.59 85.67 4.00
Quartile3 0.33 5.77 1363200.00 6.33 10.87 68.22 19.97 99.94 5.72
Std. 0.26 2.58 19385458.78 5.52 37.92 14.43 22.96 1986.09 5.07
Min. −3.16 −8.44 1000.00 0.83 2.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Max. 2.51 17.83 467385000 100.00 904.55 99.94 488.89 60685.71 79.96
Banks 1152 1141 1155 1155 1151 1155 1154 1150 1123
2005
Mean 0.37 4.81 2065022.36 6.49 12.57 58.95 17.12 231.95 5.36
Quartile 1 0.16 2.91 194000.00 5.02 8.29 52.11 9.09 69.22 3.22
Median 0.26 4.30 459500.00 5.88 9.91 60.96 13.82 84.17 4.50
Quartile3 0.40 5.97 1149500.00 6.95 12.25 68.04 20.15 98.85 6.32
Std. 0.45 3.01 18504357.21 4.82 21.83 14.14 20.78 2736.63 4.77
Min. −1.84 −9.09 2000.00 0.85 3.44 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00
Max. 6.06 18.29 493659000.00 99.96 540.68 99.88 500.00 81533.33 79.91
Banks 1416 1347 1421 1421 1416 1421 1420 1416 1384
2006
Mean 0.36 5.25 3715987.30 6.90 14.14 58.58 17.50 285.53 5.35
Quartile 1 0.17 2.98 189225.00 5.19 8.62 51.59 9.59 68.49 2.99
Median 0.27 4.40 472700.00 6.13 10.47 60.74 14.56 83.25 4.55
Quartile3 0.44 6.58 1165350.00 7.31 13.02 67.41 20.74 98.44 6.39
Std. 0.32 3.45 48029105.07 5.72 39.94 14.34 17.85 3339.47 5.01
Min. −0.34 −8.14 1242.00 0.44 3.43 0.00 0.14 2.23 −0.81
Table 1: Evolution of the financial ratios on the entire period (2000-2014)
(Contd...)
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Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Max. 4.03 18.18 1571768000 100.00 985.42 99.71 463.49 68337.50 81.00
Banks 1444 1431 1448 1448 1443 1448 1444 1440 1419
2007
Mean 0.26 3.81 4664078.32 7.06 13.03 57.83 20.41 350.59 5.26
Quartile 1 0.14 2.43 190000.00 5.23 8.83 50.56 11.60 67.10 2.97
Median 0.22 3.55 484250.00 6.15 10.71 59.62 17.05 82.55 4.41
Quartile3 0.32 4.76 1224675.00 7.38 13.41 66.80 23.95 97.89 6.23
Std. 0.28 2.27 61833292.63 6.49 16.34 14.42 20.51 4689.04 5.11
Min. −2.48 −6.74 1245.70 0.02 3.40c 0.00 0.04 1.65 0.00
Max. 3.48 16.87 1925003000 99.96 468.13 99.89 537.26 124160.00 81.24
Banks 1461 1444 1466 1466 1458 1464 1461 1457 1439
2008
Mean 0.21 3.13 4939108.96 6.86 13.80 56.24 21.93 231.42 5.29
Quartile 1 0.10 1.76 202000.00 5.09 8.84 48.81 13.66 64.79 2.89
Median 0.18 2.87 510800.00 6.02 10.68 57.54 18.55 80.30 4.34
Quartile3 0.27 4.07 1311099.15 7.27 13.49 65.15 25.10 95.02 6.20
Std. 0.35 2.29 68341656.41 5.89 25.50 14.40 24.05 2780.84 5.99
Min. −5.60 −8.49 322.00 0.02 3.41 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00
Max. 4.20 17.83 2202423000 100.00 695.24 99.97 585.08 69510.00 91.38
Banks 1462 1441 1467 1467 1460 1465 1462 1456 1442
2009
Mean 0.28 4.13 6306193.48 7.00 14.62 55.49 17.83 166.59 5.15
Quartile 1 0.14 2.47 200614.70 5.25 9.22 48.01 9.64 63.40 2.97
Median 0.23 3.65 514850.00 6.13 11.16 56.81 14.90 77.96 4.24
Quartile3 0.37 5.23 1364025.00 7.44 14.21 64.82 20.91 92.08 6.12
Std. 0.47 2.66 85716843.14 5.71 28.96 14.48 23.97 1560.54 4.98
Min. −8.24 −8.38 1425.80 0.02 3.06 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00
Max. 9.33 18.18 2568259000 100.00 656.46 99.93 793.91 43737.50 82.38
Banks 1508 1482 1512 1512 1502 1509 1507 1503 1491
2010
Mean 0.32 4.42 6408359.86 7.44 15.51 55.95 17.72 230.05 5.75
Quartile 1 0.16 2.54 200650.00 5.60 9.56 48.28 9.24 62.89 3.26
Median 0.26 3.89 518050.00 6.52 11.72 57.74 13.89 77.11 4.88
Quartile3 0.40 5.61 1341750.00 7.81 14.86 65.37 20.26 92.36 6.89
Std. 0.49 2.89 89551001.50 6.40 33.49 14.78 27.78 3320.16 5.21
Min. −6.63 −7.30 1674.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 8.65 18.18 2587312000 100.00 746.92 99.90 872.12 96480.00 83.50
Banks 1551 1525 1554 1554 1543 1551 1546 1544 1537
2011
Mean 0.31 4.05 6337040.62 8.18 18.65 56.33 18.80 267.55 5.92
Quartile 1 0.15 2.24 204700.00 6.20 10.60 48.80 10.03 63.82 3.45
Median 0.25 3.54 528100.00 7.34 12.95 58.05 14.76 78.09 4.90
Quartile3 0.39 5.23 1366100.00 8.70 16.23 65.73 21.15 93.66 7.05
Std. 0.46 2.81 89232829.96 6.37 50.31 14.93 29.56 3862.43 5.69
Min. −6.09 −8.29 930.00 0.04 3.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 6.96 18.00 2440114000 100.00 802.63 99.84 916.09 101622.54 93.86
Banks 1589 1564 1593 1593 1580 1588 1586 1582 1577
2012
Mean 0.31 3.91 6267327.29 8.78 20.47 57.04 16.50 263.57 5.77
Quartile 1 0.16 2.08 210700.00 6.76 11.32 49.33 7.62 64.83 3.41
Median 0.26 3.34 543900.00 7.88 13.62 58.84 11.53 79.69 4.92
Quartile3 0.41 5.10 1410800.00 9.25 17.10 66.68 17.76 95.67 6.89
Std. 0.42 2.86 86705981.73 6.66 57.14 15.24 33.14 3886.43 5.19
Min. −4.98 −9.81 904.20 0.33 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 6.47 17.80 2414261000 99.96 981.13 98.07 926.58 109876.32 84.65
Banks 1584 1563 1589 1589 1578 1585 1583 1581 1573
2013
Mean 0.29 3.35 5842188.32 9.25 19.75 58.35 15.20 264.06 5.78
Quartile 1 0.15 1.86 217400.00 7.29 12.00 50.36 6.53 66.06 3.46
Median 0.24 2.96 561600.00 8.45 14.33 59.94 10.55 80.35 4.95
Quartile3 0.36 4.31 1435225.00 9.88 17.95 68.18 15.96 96.31 7.05
Std. 0.35 2.39 77822403.19 6.15 46.79 15.30 33.71 3792.06 4.98
Table 1: (Continued)
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Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Min. −3.40 −9.54 1424.10 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 4.55 18.27 2252689000 100.00 931.33 99.07 879.49 103037.21 85.31
Banks 1570 1558 1574 1574 1565 1572 1569 1567 1562
2014
Mean 0.28 3.12 6615616.76 9.62 18.73 58.78 13.28 232.58 5.97
Quartile 1 0.15 1.77 289200.00 7.65 12.45 51.10 5.59 65.97 3.63
Median 0.24 2.74 693200.00 8.78 14.87 60.68 9.24 80.21 5.13
Quartile3 0.36 3.94 1703100.00 10.18 18.21 68.59 14.35 95.90 7.01
Std. 0.36 2.24 85956282.42 6.27 30.92 15.22 17.90 3036.81 5.47
Min. −5.43 −9.32 1209.60 2.12 4.30 0.05 0.33 1.56 0.01
Max. 3.27 18.25 2240721000 98.77 655.74 97.20 301.45 85123.47 85.42
Banks 1153 1145 1157 1157 1151 1157 1154 1153 1135
Table 1: (Continued)
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Sp1 commercial banks
Mean 0.48 4.45 28205815.64 14.23 58.06 47.74 49.10 2135.41 9.67
Quartile 1 0.06 0.69 228136.50 4.86 8.98 19.62 11.76 44.59 2.31
Median 0.33 3.57 796550.00 7.71 16.67 48.82 30.13 86.58 5.10
Quartile3 0.76 7.19 2885025.00 13.01 42.02 74.49 62.53 140.38 10.33
Std. 1.16 4.98 164758154.12 19.00 133.04 30.29 80.63 11260.35 14.95
Min. −8.24 −9.81 322.00 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 9.68 18.35 2202423000 100.00 985.42 99.97 926.58 124160 85.42
banks 95.47 84.33 96.27 96.27 90.07 94.87 93.00 89.93 88.80
Sp2 cooperative banks
Mean 0.31 4.64 1009821.15 6.87 12.33 58.90 15.88 81.21 5.29
Quartile 1 0.18 2.93 156600.00 5.37 8.89 51.65 9.57 66.45 3.28
Median 0.27 4.13 330300.00 6.47 11.11 60.29 14.29 79.91 4.63
Quartile3 0.39 5.77 653500.00 7.94 14.16 67.22 20.07 93.39 6.52
Std. 0.26 2.68 11259179.74 2.67 7.86 12.12 11.66 35.88 3.33
Min. −2.43 −9.75 2000.00 1.97 2.89 5.69 0.26 6.61 0.00
Max. 4.22 18.29 431337000 86.28 447.62 92.78 575.00 1258.65 93.86
Banks 841.13 830.93 842.93 842.93 842.93 842.93 842.60 842.60 829.40
Sp3 saving bank
Mean 0.19 3.23 5807414.84 6.22 11.10 59.21 13.57 121.77 5.10
Quartile 1 0.10 1.65 665900.00 4.66 7.77 52.51 7.55 72.34 3.01
Median 0.17 2.85 1368600.00 5.69 9.66 60.80 11.63 88.07 4.33
Quartile3 0.25 4.42 2582200.00 7.32 12.84 67.63 17.49 105.49 6.09
Std. 0.16 2.16 81639599.37 2.48 10.24 12.65 8.54 1349.30 3.70
Min. −3.16 −9.85 23423.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.14 1.59 −0.81
Max. 2.84 16.11 2587312000 75.92 731.54 95.59 99.28 62600.00 91.38
Banks 435.20 433.73 436.60 436.60 436.07 436.60 436.60 436.60 433.80
Table 2: Financial ratios of banks according to their specialties
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Commercial/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000
Mean 0.697 4.872 17376955.098 13.872 71.475 47.354 51.357 666.949 9.421
quartile 1 0.11 0.59 200975.00 4.21 7.94 20.95 15.99 56.27 1.98
Median 0.37 3.54 439800.00 7.11 13.50 46.70 35.57 94.87 5.75
Quartile3 0.73 7.29 1429500.00 12.36 42.32 74.05 63.90 162.58 10.56
Std. 1.30 5.01 91918296.32 19.07 169.97 30.76 73.80 3296.24 14.00
Min. −1.59 −5.77 20600.00 2.58 4.06 0.14 0.06 3.64 0.00
Max. 9.68 18.35 694267000. 99.96 900.00 99.93 590.76 28033.33 81.39
Banks 81 71 82 82 78 82 81 79 79
2001
Mean 0.480 4.848 19445602.701 11.266 46.019 48.210 48.689 807.531 9.365
Quartile 1 0.11 0.77 224400.00 4.54 8.17 21.39 14.87 54.64 2.51
Median 0.32 3.87 571700.00 6.90 14.73 47.19 37.97 95.04 5.00
Quartile3 0.74 7.93 1513100.00 11.49 41.34 73.85 55.23 147.05 10.39
Std. 0.82 5.35 99826346.76 15.28 90.06 29.93 70.42 3992.04 14.05
Min. −2.25 −6.34 45700.00 2.27 3.92 0.70 0.08 7.44 0.00
Max. 4.00 18.24 716241000 100.00 558.88 99.89 576.16 31126.09 81.11
Banks 76 70 77 77 75 77 76 74 75
2002
Mean 0.394 3.473 15286372.41 12.239 56.279 47.246 52.838 2178.452 9.824
Quartile 1 0.06 0.33 259800.00 4.88 8.47 18.98 14.42 51.41 2.76
Median 0.23 2.73 615700.00 7.12 17.87 41.58 30.00 90.61 5.23
Quartile3 0.60 5.95 1471700.00 11.09 56.99 76.79 69.57 154.59 12.92
Std. 0.97 3.76 77571257.00 17.30 117.96 30.65 75.25 9498.62 13.73
Min. −5.70 −4.24 61300.00 2.27 3.93 0.79 0.07 0.95 0.01
Max. 3.81 15.01 526452000 100.00 775.74 99.90 494.29 67480.00 80.73
Banks 76 69 77 77 75 77 76 74 74
2003
Mean 0.37 4.49 14757502.01 13.00 43.67 49.64 49.39 1406.84 9.69
Quartile 1 0.00 0.60 297100.00 4.80 8.81 25.24 13.59 51.57 2.45
Median 0.27 3.22 686950.00 7.58 16.14 44.15 29.76 91.43 5.97
Quartile3 0.62 7.54 1638325.00 11.96 45.88 83.52 61.66 133.82 10.37
Std. 0.89 5.22 69641003.33 17.48 99.14 31.06 69.62 6681.27 14.09
Min. −3.38 −9.77 1407.60 1.22 3.57 0.37 0.00 6.58 0.01
Max. 3.19 18.32 473167000.00 98.79 735.00 99.85 499.32 51885.71 80.19
Banks 77 68 78 78 74 78 77 74 74
2004
Mean 0.48 4.43 16006987.81 13.71 61.88 45.87 52.61 1636.51 9.60
Quartile 1 0.06 0.88 287300.00 4.39 8.05 15.45 11.91 40.89 2.84
Median 0.28 3.37 774900.00 6.80 17.27 36.70 35.74 88.17 5.33
Quartile3 0.82 7.23 2151600.00 12.70 50.86 80.35 65.79 141.92 10.79
Std. 0.69 4.26 70981402.74 18.69 137.88 32.40 73.67 7624.69 14.57
Min. −1.38 −0.26 1000.00 0.83 4.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Max. 2.51 16.65 467385000.00 100.00 904.55 99.94 488.89 60685.71 79.96
Banks 80 72 81 81 77 81 80 76 75
2005
Mean 0.60 4.98 16759570.31 12.07 44.29 47.15 45.25 2651.41 9.50
Quartile 1 0.13 1.00 340675.00 4.61 8.03 18.12 12.42 49.36 2.73
Median 0.37 3.77 862100.00 6.82 16.41 42.86 33.39 103.60 5.11
Quartile3 0.73 7.53 2486200.00 12.27 37.58 75.60 64.59 157.70 11.86
Std. 0.84 4.78 72805356.03 16.09 83.20 31.19 50.72 11231.69 14.42
Min. −0.35 −4.09 8100.00 0.85 3.67 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00
Max. 6.06 18.29 493659000.00 99.96 540.68 99.88 337.43 81533.33 79.91
Banks 85 78 86 86 82 86 85 81 78
2006
Mean 0.69 5.59 36241200.63 13.95 59.01 48.43 44.95 3494.97 10.70
Quartile 1 0.13 1.11 317437.00 4.59 8.45 19.64 12.20 46.49 2.82
(Contd...)
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Commercial/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Median 0.44 4.43 805600.00 7.32 17.14 46.86 30.88 97.80 6.09
Quartile3 1.01 9.06 2842625.00 11.11 40.69 79.32 67.09 155.25 11.58
Std. 0.77 5.43 182575508.17 19.43 154.60 31.68 55.92 13414.64 15.40
Min. −0.34 −8.14 1242.00 0.44 3.43 0.00 0.21 3.15 0.00
Max. 4.03 17.42 1571768000.00 100.00 985.42 99.71 463.49 68337.50 81.00
Banks 92 83 92 92 88 92 89 85 84
2007
Mean 0.56 4.66 36421851.04 14.67 34.01 50.20 47.67 4277.21 11.30
Quartile 1 0.00 0.00 250077.20 4.75 8.90 21.44 11.67 43.61 2.85
Median 0.31 3.05 1020600.00 6.95 15.64 49.08 32.35 96.04 6.12
Quartile3 0.94 8.14 3232200.00 11.20 40.35 79.20 66.00 152.78 12.16
Std. 0.85 5.20 204760617.71 21.08 54.92 31.46 65.29 18201.84 15.80
Min. −2.48 −2.93 1245.70 0.02 3.40 0.00 0.04 2.22 0.00
Max. 3.48 16.87 1925003000.00 99.96 468.13 99.89 537.26 124160.00 81.24
Banks 101 86 101 101 94 99 97 93 89
2008
Mean 0.35 3.85 40965153.20 13.54 44.59 49.01 50.79 2519.93 10.12
Quartile 1 0.00 0.00 250694.30 4.15 8.09 22.84 11.03 39.07 1.75
Median 0.23 2.41 1024050.00 6.77 14.14 45.27 31.73 96.74 4.85
Quartile3 0.80 5.89 3247575.00 12.12 36.97 77.91 72.39 161.87 11.37
Std. 1.20 5.42 232865722.40 18.75 92.84 31.35 81.93 10989.15 15.94
Min. −5.60 −6.37 322.00 0.02 3.85 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00
Max. 4.20 17.66 2202423000.00 100.00 695.24 99.97 585.08 69510.00 81.17
Banks 98 84 100 100 94 98 96 90 90
2009
Mean 0.47 4.12 33017204.68 13.43 49.56 46.98 44.91 1421.25 9.29
Quartile 1 0.00 0.26 214051.63 4.42 8.63 18.28 10.66 41.28 2.00
Median 0.28 3.43 1021900.00 7.07 15.21 48.28 27.64 83.87 4.73
Quartile3 0.75 6.76 3158600.00 12.71 38.71 70.95 60.24 137.87 8.94
Std. 1.64 4.77 170753253.50 17.94 105.41 29.62 81.92 5999.42 14.99
Min. −8.24 −8.38 1425.80 0.02 3.06 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00
Max. 9.33 17.00 1500664000.00 100.00 656.46 99.93 793.91 43737.50 82.38
Banks 106 89 106 106 97 103 102 98 97
2010
Mean 0.59 4.34 33682190.46 15.21 53.45 46.54 51.15 2322.28 10.03
Quartile 1 0.06 0.94 198978.00 4.94 9.19 17.65 12.11 41.98 2.24
Median 0.37 4.15 917200.00 7.48 15.83 49.10 28.27 76.98 5.00
Quartile3 0.86 6.99 3402900.00 13.81 40.56 69.23 57.91 132.21 9.84
Std. 1.60 4.72 195639230.86 20.40 120.65 29.76 95.25 12664.01 15.38
Min. −6.63 −7.30 1674.30 0.03 3.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 8.65 16.60 1905630000.00 100.00 746.92 99.90 872.12 96480.00 83.50
Banks 113 95 113 113 102 110 106 104 101
2011
Mean 0.39 4.68 33016584.62 15.23 73.77 46.29 49.78 2340.46 9.26
Quartile 1 0.06 0.95 146600.00 4.97 9.72 17.23 11.76 36.81 2.11
Median 0.30 3.83 785500.00 8.27 16.15 49.09 29.74 77.72 4.48
Quartile3 0.76 7.43 3647200.00 13.61 44.50 72.40 61.91 123.48 9.16
Std. 1.35 5.23 208166678.43 19.96 168.03 30.00 93.16 13805.68 15.20
Min. −6.09 −6.54 930.00 0.04 3.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 6.96 17.72 2164103000.00 100.00 802.63 99.84 916.09 101622.54 84.14
Banks 120 107 121 121 108 116 114 110 109
Table 3: (Continued)
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2012
Mean 0.38 3.99 31412999.41 16.45 91.32 46.55 52.58 2079.82 8.93
Quartile 1 0.04 0.88 149300.00 5.59 10.74 19.65 10.22 44.48 2.30
Median 0.36 3.56 865000.00 8.53 16.87 51.25 28.49 78.93 4.01
Quartile3 0.72 6.67 3345600.00 16.36 46.75 70.13 62.46 138.29 8.58
Std. 1.31 4.96 195089502.25 20.90 198.05 29.76 100.43 13214.05 15.20
Min. −4.98 −9.81 904.20 0.33 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 6.47 16.48 2022275000.00 99.96 981.13 98.07 926.58 109876.32 84.65
Banks 119 102 121 121 111 117 115 113 111
2013
Mean 0.52 4.53 27503592.14 16.13 74.53 48.75 53.56 2183.27 8.66
Quartile 1 0.06 0.65 178000.00 6.09 12.48 21.54 11.33 46.27 1.89
Median 0.30 3.21 747200.00 9.14 19.28 53.26 24.57 79.11 4.01
Quartile3 0.72 7.41 3762900.00 16.14 41.54 72.51 56.73 122.03 8.36
Std. 1.05 5.28 159674955.78 20.23 166.83 29.51 116.04 13242.23 14.96
Min. −3.40 −9.54 1424.10 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 4.55 18.27 1611400000 100.00 931.33 99.07 879.49 103037.21 85.31
Banks 116 105 117 117 109 115 112 110 110
2014
Mean 0.31 4.00 35998122.48 15.82 51.62 48.39 39.73 1462.38 9.79
Quartile 1 0.07 1.37 226611.50 6.39 13.54 23.53 10.09 48.71 2.41
Median 0.34 3.35 1089400.00 8.81 18.79 53.27 22.07 81.40 4.76
Quartile3 0.79 7.27 3119800.00 13.63 41.81 74.02 62.53 137.79 10.02
Std. 1.05 4.78 189466272.03 18.94 105.49 27.82 49.87 9429.78 16.31
Min. −5.43 −9.32 1209.60 2.12 4.30 0.05 0.33 1.56 0.01
Max. 2.73 18.25 1708703000.00 98.77 655.74 97.20 301.45 85123.47 85.42
Banks 92 86 92 92 87 92 89 88 86
Cooperatives/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000
Mean 0.206 4.659 471535.804 5.365 8.540 64.656 14.442 90.359 5.569
Quartile 1 0.15 3.13 142700.00 4.57 6.98 59.68 9.38 77.69 3.52
Median 0.23 4.64 279000.00 5.22 8.03 66.25 12.91 91.21 4.72
Quartile3 0.32 6.12 495100.00 5.91 9.24 71.70 17.83 103.22 6.52
Std. 0.30 3.05 905767.12 1.38 2.80 10.32 7.55 20.30 3.48
Min. −1.64 −9.23 11600.00 2.09 3.97 9.31 1.51 9.93 1.06
Max. 2.59 16.33 18176200.00 21.94 33.44 82.96 70.34 168.00 35.61
Banks 715 689 715 715 715 715 715 715 706
2001
Mean 0.245 4.792 514263.713 5.354 8.806 62.700 16.381 86.968 5.144
Quartile 1 0.16 3.35 158500.00 4.58 7.17 57.07 11.20 72.82 3.18
Median 0.24 4.58 306200.00 5.22 8.24 64.02 15.15 86.82 4.43
Quartile3 0.32 6.19 551600.00 5.90 9.71 69.98 19.89 98.55 6.06
Std. 0.25 2.49 1003167.05 1.30 2.80 10.38 7.68 33.91 3.17
Min. −2.43 −9.75 12400.00 2.18 3.91 10.20 2.00 10.94 0.62
Max. 1.82 14.49 20656800.00 17.32 30.54 90.62 70.40 814.01 33.29
Banks 710 694 711 711 711 711 711 711 692
2002
Mean 0.275 5.214 568103.613 5.534 9.246 61.876 16.592 85.685 4.964
Quartile 1 0.17 3.30 182600.00 4.71 7.49 56.02 11.07 71.37 3.11
Median 0.25 4.71 336300.00 5.39 8.58 63.11 15.59 84.63 4.25
Quartile3 0.36 6.34 602600.00 6.12 10.13 68.74 20.43 96.34 5.83
Std. 0.22 2.94 1116412.91 1.37 3.13 10.43 7.89 43.15 3.16
Min. −0.98 −5.11 12500.00 2.10 3.07 10.26 2.23 11.23 0.41
Max. 1.46 18.21 22787100.00 20.07 36.01 84.57 74.07 1096.54 30.41
Banks 692 683 692 692 692 692 692 692 669
2003
Mean 0.25 4.66 615795.14 5.66 9.56 61.42 15.73 84.47 5.21
Quartile 1 0.16 3.13 212825.00 4.84 7.73 55.57 10.02 70.02 3.39
Median 0.24 4.38 369450.00 5.48 8.88 62.55 14.79 83.80 4.55
Quartile3 0.32 5.82 628300.00 6.24 10.47 69.17 19.88 95.27 6.22
Std. 0.18 2.52 1241490.32 1.43 3.29 10.87 7.72 44.61 3.19
Min. −1.66 −8.96 13900.00 2.09 2.89 10.80 1.67 11.65 0.08
(Contd...)
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Cooperatives/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Max. 1.04 16.24 25493700.00 22.81 39.28 88.18 73.33 1114.78 31.98
Banks 656 654 658 658 658 658 658 658 631
2004
Mean 0.28 4.82 629256.59 5.84 10.07 60.37 16.66 83.09 5.01
Quartile 1 0.18 3.25 220175.00 4.97 8.03 54.23 10.45 69.45 3.04
Median 0.25 4.59 379650.00 5.63 9.27 61.74 15.52 82.36 4.24
Quartile3 0.36 5.97 637925.00 6.45 11.03 68.09 21.35 94.13 6.03
Std. 0.16 2.51 1291943.14 1.56 3.69 11.24 8.26 45.31 3.35
Min. −0.40 −8.44 14500.00 2.06 3.08 11.16 1.48 11.87 0.08
Max. 1.10 17.83 27266600.00 27.24 46.26 87.35 72.67 1140.18 39.58
Banks 666 665 668 668 668 668 668 668 645
2005
Mean 0.42 5.33 519567.31 6.46 11.26 59.80 16.93 82.09 5.37
Quartile 1 0.20 3.36 126200.00 5.33 8.81 52.68 10.27 67.38 3.38
Median 0.30 4.65 278300.00 6.23 10.35 61.26 15.14 80.99 4.83
Quartile3 0.44 6.45 541575.00 7.25 12.48 68.19 20.93 94.71 6.53
Std. 0.46 3.10 1220114.64 2.28 4.93 11.83 17.97 44.81 3.19
Min. −1.84 −9.09 2000.00 2.10 3.44 11.37 1.26 12.49 0.50
Max. 3.56 18.29 29569000.00 55.00 110.00 90.15 500.00 1000.00 37.07
Banks 917 857 920 920 920 920 920 920 895
2006
Mean 0.40 5.97 1069149.05 6.79 11.96 59.20 16.83 81.18 5.20
Quartile 1 0.22 3.51 128500.00 5.54 9.31 52.03 10.57 66.55 3.10
Median 0.32 5.07 282800.00 6.51 11.04 60.96 15.36 80.50 4.76
Quartile3 0.52 7.45 564900.00 7.69 13.42 67.41 21.29 93.78 6.58
Std. 0.27 3.48 14037047.78 2.26 5.36 12.03 9.54 33.17 3.04
Min. −0.29 −2.74 2200.00 2.32 3.51 12.78 1.40 14.81 0.64
Max. 2.71 18.18 421684000 50.00 122.22 86.73 139.58 868.93 33.00
Banks 939 934 941 941 941 941 940 940 923
2007
Mean 0.28 4.17 1113107.59 6.87 12.30 58.50 18.85 80.44 4.99
Quartile 1 0.19 2.91 132175.00 5.53 9.43 51.43 12.01 65.64 3.07
Median 0.26 3.84 292950.00 6.58 11.07 59.83 17.19 80.09 4.54
Quartile3 0.35 5.05 583550.00 7.75 13.77 67.15 23.42 92.90 6.33
Std. 0.15 1.90 14379748.90 2.99 7.90 12.09 9.90 31.44 2.82
Min. 0.00 0.00 5800.00 2.25 3.49 15.29 1.79 16.54 0.56
Max. 1.61 15.39 431337000 79.31 219.05 87.98 134.98 793.81 30.70
Banks 941 940 944 944 944 944 943 943 933
2008
Mean 0.23 3.53 1157230.00 6.70 12.35 56.55 20.53 78.17 5.05
Quartile 1 0.14 2.34 140500.00 5.34 9.53 49.40 14.63 63.81 2.98
Median 0.21 3.24 311400.00 6.35 11.14 57.54 18.93 77.80 4.46
Quartile3 0.30 4.41 628300.00 7.57 13.76 64.87 25.10 90.33 6.35
Std. 0.17 1.89 14263234.47 3.16 6.96 12.00 9.60 34.96 3.95
Min. −1.12 −7.19 6200.00 1.97 3.41 16.72 1.23 18.47 0.60
Max. 2.19 17.83 427127000 85.48 182.76 87.32 115.12 943.04 85.98
Banks 945 940 947 947 947 947 946 946 934
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Table 3: (Continued)
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2009
Mean 0.31 4.69 1214817.31 6.78 12.73 55.78 16.24 77.06 4.95
Quartile 1 0.19 3.03 148700.00 5.44 9.70 48.38 10.20 62.69 3.00
Median 0.27 4.15 326700.00 6.37 11.57 56.50 15.07 76.50 4.33
Quartile3 0.40 5.63 678400.00 7.69 14.30 64.17 20.35 88.59 6.12
Std. 0.18 2.52 13216666.47 3.18 7.74 12.16 8.66 34.73 3.00
Min. −0.69 −0.85 5100.00 2.48 3.35 15.37 0.50 17.01 0.57
Max. 1.18 18.18 388525000 86.28 209.52 87.84 91.01 930.07 34.39
Banks 942 937 945 945 945 945 944 944 936
2010
Mean 0.35 5.08 1235266.21 7.06 13.33 56.10 15.51 77.07 5.46
Quartile 1 0.20 3.23 153550.00 5.76 10.09 48.54 9.62 62.42 3.36
Median 0.30 4.40 340550.00 6.70 12.08 57.27 14.00 74.90 4.83
Quartile3 0.44 6.25 706650.00 7.95 14.86 64.35 19.67 87.82 6.81
Std. 0.24 2.82 13020023.31 2.92 9.63 12.25 8.60 44.23 3.24
Min. −0.16 −1.96 8100.00 2.71 3.46 17.53 0.55 18.80 0.40
Max. 3.53 18.18 383464000 77.78 273.91 89.28 66.95 1258.65 32.66
Banks 948 941 950 950 950 950 949 949 947
2011
Mean 0.35 4.66 1282165.47 7.57 14.23 56.39 16.65 78.09 5.73
Quartile 1 0.20 3.01 160400.00 6.15 10.75 48.74 10.42 63.05 3.57
Median 0.29 4.09 351400.00 7.23 12.93 57.35 14.82 75.56 4.92
Quartile3 0.43 5.81 730500.00 8.58 15.87 64.46 20.01 88.97 7.05
Std. 0.31 2.59 13671930.13 2.96 9.77 12.27 15.78 33.05 4.34
Min. −1.24 −8.29 6800.00 2.65 3.56 17.82 0.26 19.06 0.30
Max. 4.22 18.00 405926000 76.47 273.68 89.20 420.00 756.82 93.86
Banks 955 947 957 957 957 957 957 957 955
2012
Mean 0.36 4.64 1312590.65 8.12 15.32 57.06 13.64 79.15 5.49
Quartile 1 0.21 2.81 166425.00 6.71 11.51 49.36 7.52 64.54 3.44
Median 0.31 4.00 368250.00 7.78 13.76 57.98 11.20 76.77 4.82
Quartile3 0.45 5.74 755700.00 9.19 16.91 65.32 16.66 91.16 6.88
Std. 0.24 2.73 13740194.01 2.93 15.02 12.66 20.04 27.53 3.17
Min. 0.00 0.00 12600.00 3.10 4.76 16.67 1.10 20.58 0.22
Max. 2.97 17.80 407236000 74.60 447.62 89.75 575.00 534.74 31.96
Banks 954 950 956 956 956 956 956 956 952
2013
Mean 0.32 3.85 1308897.07 8.70 15.82 58.43 11.82 80.15 5.54
Quartile 1 0.20 2.49 172550.00 7.24 12.19 50.51 6.26 66.04 3.53
Median 0.28 3.42 376500.00 8.41 14.38 59.35 9.80 77.28 4.90
Quartile3 0.40 4.80 788225.00 9.81 17.73 66.53 14.58 93.01 6.97
Std. 0.20 2.05 13066656.35 2.05 6.99 12.91 8.36 27.03 3.09
Min. 0.00 0.00 16037.30 3.60 5.10 13.02 0.59 22.21 0.00
Max. 2.25 17.97 385398000 22.09 137.68 92.78 71.74 497.01 30.32
Banks 948 947 950 950 950 950 950 950 947
2014
Mean 0.33 3.59 1694429.88 9.04 16.20 59.11 10.07 80.52 5.57
Quartile 1 0.19 2.30 235500.00 7.67 12.52 51.74 5.31 65.95 3.59
Median 0.28 3.15 485250.00 8.75 14.79 60.22 8.21 77.84 5.08
Quartile3 0.40 4.44 948750.00 10.04 18.27 67.33 12.15 91.62 6.86
Std. 0.25 1.90 15982642.77 2.11 6.07 12.88 7.74 29.82 3.11
Min. 0.00 0.00 27400.00 3.43 6.08 5.69 0.97 6.61 0.20
Max. 3.27 13.36 402543000 27.57 60.20 91.70 84.50 583.22 26.51
Banks 689 686 690 690 690 690 690 690 676
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Savings/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000
Mean 0.231 5.285 1804075.871 4.488 7.661 60.331 10.256 97.029 5.426
Quartile 1 0.16 3.61 699975.00 3.92 6.26 55.16 6.20 79.80 2.99
Median 0.23 5.26 1220350.00 4.35 7.18 61.79 9.46 96.99 4.38
Quartile3 0.31 6.58 2165675.00 4.98 8.68 68.42 13.44 113.64 6.08
Std. 0.15 2.41 1877702.37 0.86 1.83 11.28 5.46 28.25 3.61
Min. −1.77 0.22 135400.00 2.50 4.33 21.74 1.77 25.87 0.89
Max. 0.71 15.23 15503200.00 8.25 15.71 86.68 33.77 229.07 19.67
Banks 401 398 402 402 402 402 402 402 400
2001
Mean 0.209 4.577 1879846.633 4.556 7.836 59.924 11.349 94.194 5.206
Quartile 1 0.12 2.76 742200.00 3.98 6.40 54.38 7.46 78.10 2.85
Median 0.19 4.46 1295100.00 4.39 7.42 61.20 10.47 94.20 3.99
Quartile3 0.28 5.97 2265400.00 5.03 8.85 67.53 14.03 110.14 5.82
Std. 0.12 2.52 1952639.94 0.88 1.91 11.17 5.42 27.29 3.64
Min. 0.00 0.00 144800.00 2.61 4.70 22.07 1.11 24.99 0.88
Max. 0.70 16.11 16214700.00 8.28 16.84 83.75 32.46 221.57 19.55
Banks 400 400 401 401 401 401 401 401 399
2002
Mean 0.170 3.750 2213451.861 4.690 8.048 60.087 11.934 94.011 5.177
Quartile 1 0.08 2.00 750650.00 4.04 6.60 54.54 7.51 77.74 2.83
Median 0.16 3.70 1319500.00 4.55 7.56 61.67 10.69 94.14 3.84
Quartile3 0.25 5.28 2373050.00 5.18 9.02 67.78 14.84 110.05 5.62
Std. 0.14 2.32 5381164.18 0.92 2.00 11.25 6.36 27.15 4.33
Min. −0.96 −9.85 143200.00 2.59 3.98 20.16 1.72 22.72 0.86
Max. 0.52 11.22 101538000.00 8.37 15.65 83.53 39.23 200.80 51.37
Banks 400 397 403 403 403 403 403 403 399
2003
Mean 0.17 3.69 2307547.41 4.87 8.30 60.63 10.69 94.50 5.22
Quartile 1 0.09 1.98 759800.00 4.20 6.81 54.55 6.16 77.97 2.85
Median 0.16 3.56 1330600.00 4.72 7.77 62.19 9.04 94.95 3.93
Quartile3 0.25 5.20 2469400.00 5.41 9.38 68.53 13.65 111.05 5.65
Std. 0.13 2.35 5567262.41 0.97 2.14 11.70 6.52 27.34 4.30
Min. −0.70 −0.09 140200.00 2.59 4.87 19.44 1.49 21.94 0.59
Max. 0.75 15.89 101744000.00 8.35 17.37 83.18 44.96 190.98 51.16
Banks 403 401 405 405 405 405 405 405 400
2004
Mean 0.19 3.90 2366128.82 5.09 8.77 60.05 11.43 93.22 4.02
Quartile 1 0.11 2.42 785725.00 4.35 7.06 53.75 6.52 76.80 2.54
Median 0.19 3.80 1364350.00 4.99 8.22 61.55 9.31 92.81 3.52
Quartile3 0.27 5.27 2589300.00 5.66 9.92 68.11 14.61 110.82 4.77
Std. 0.22 2.18 5533756.24 1.06 2.35 11.81 6.92 26.57 3.13
Min. −3.16 −4.15 153100.00 1.17 2.11 18.82 1.77 21.18 0.52
Max. 1.73 14.10 100646000.00 8.83 19.49 84.15 43.69 186.91 51.03
Banks 406 404 406 406 406 406 406 406 403
2005
Mean 0.20 3.70 2445956.14 5.42 9.19 59.52 11.79 91.93 4.57
Quartile 1 0.12 2.43 769300.00 4.54 7.48 53.90 6.93 75.99 2.87
Median 0.18 3.62 1377800.00 5.15 8.57 60.99 10.51 92.17 3.93
Quartile3 0.26 4.89 2586550.00 5.95 10.35 67.64 14.55 109.16 5.36
Std. 0.15 1.89 5705246.79 2.67 2.54 12.02 7.04 26.38 3.38
Min. 0.00 0.00 132000.00 2.69 5.01 0.59 0.72 1.59 0.56
Max. 1.82 11.30 101996000.00 54.90 22.88 84.94 48.04 187.96 51.14
Banks 414 412 415 415 414 415 415 415 411
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Savings/year
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
Mean 0.19 3.56 2507204.58 5.60 9.55 59.43 13.12 91.05 4.61
Quartile 1 0.11 2.19 772450.00 4.71 7.76 53.42 7.50 75.15 2.85
Median 0.18 3.47 1419300.00 5.37 8.81 60.96 10.98 91.41 4.14
Quartile3 0.25 4.62 2678350.00 6.11 10.77 67.03 17.11 109.42 5.45
Std. 0.11 1.95 5981853.00 2.64 2.75 12.06 7.58 26.01 3.39
Min. 0.00 0.00 127000.00 2.80 5.28 0.82 0.14 2.23 −0.81
Max. 0.73 14.33 107419000.00 53.97 27.05 82.70 41.81 194.82 51.16
Banks 413 414 415 415 414 415 415 415 412
2007
Mean 0.16 2.80 5007501.89 5.67 9.98 58.13 17.61 88.30 4.57
Quartile 1 0.09 1.70 767400.00 4.74 8.00 51.77 11.10 71.50 2.81
Median 0.15 2.74 1450400.00 5.43 9.19 59.63 15.82 88.24 4.02
Quartile3 0.22 3.81 2763800.00 6.13 11.29 65.21 22.33 105.79 5.48
Std. 0.11 1.64 51170062.60 2.25 2.99 12.24 9.11 26.21 3.36
Min. −0.84 −6.74 85748.60 2.72 5.52 0.51 2.35 1.65 0.69
Max. 0.81 9.93 1045020000.00 45.09 29.24 84.50 63.09 199.29 51.17
Banks 419 418 421 421 420 421 421 421 417
2008
Mean 0.11 2.08 4888715.98 5.63 10.18 57.21 18.48 86.20 4.79
Quartile 1 0.05 0.90 798075.00 4.72 8.03 51.07 12.34 69.72 2.85
Median 0.10 1.79 1514600.00 5.44 9.43 58.16 17.43 85.95 3.99
Quartile3 0.17 3.04 2775300.00 6.25 11.53 65.32 23.27 103.03 5.64
Std. 0.12 1.60 52226509.21 1.88 3.34 12.61 8.90 25.75 5.43
Min. −1.05 −8.49 85951.60 2.71 4.62 0.74 1.14 1.95 0.67
Max. 0.48 10.05 1070753000.00 35.36 34.91 83.42 66.49 183.49 91.38
Banks 419 417 420 420 419 420 420 420 418
2009
Mean 0.17 2.97 10601168.07 5.98 11.13 56.79 15.11 83.22 4.67
Quartile 1 0.08 1.61 628900.00 4.95 8.41 49.93 8.22 68.71 2.96
Median 0.15 2.75 1420700.00 5.70 9.90 58.24 13.53 83.09 4.00
Quartile3 0.23 3.89 2575600.00 6.63 12.56 65.70 19.71 99.20 5.76
Std. 0.16 1.90 129940697.08 1.55 4.25 13.08 8.90 25.50 3.37
Min. −1.31 −2.26 27254.40 2.54 3.53 0.83 1.58 1.61 0.42
Max. 0.87 12.44 2568259000.00 13.05 39.07 85.10 51.81 178.32 51.11
Banks 460 456 461 461 460 461 461 461 458
2010
Mean 0.20 3.16 10140531.18 6.40 11.84 57.75 14.78 82.55 5.43
Quartile 1 0.10 1.77 544200.40 5.37 8.77 51.22 8.09 67.32 3.26
Median 0.17 2.75 1336100.00 6.11 10.48 59.47 12.95 82.57 4.96
Quartile3 0.27 4.09 2511600.00 7.16 13.31 66.90 19.20 97.98 6.79
Std. 0.16 2.02 126894933.32 1.68 5.28 13.44 9.26 25.69 3.55
Min. 0.00 0.00 27304.30 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.74 1.60 0.23
Max. 1.44 14.52 2587312000.00 17.82 68.30 88.33 58.34 178.57 51.11
Banks 490 489 491 491 491 491 491 491 489
2011
Mean 0.22 2.80 9461876.93 7.65 15.31 58.48 15.94 176.85 5.58
Quartile 1 0.10 1.48 487400.00 6.46 10.44 51.43 9.20 68.52 3.45
Median 0.17 2.40 1315800.00 7.41 12.63 60.08 14.20 83.63 4.88
Quartile3 0.26 3.64 2554300.00 8.59 15.64 67.32 19.83 100.39 6.83
Std. 0.23 1.92 118206328.13 1.87 32.14 13.39 9.67 2114.69 3.64
Min. −0.06 −0.92 23423.00 3.44 5.75 1.01 1.54 1.61 0.75
Max. 2.75 14.37 2440114000.00 18.48 731.54 92.86 58.97 48070.18 51.07
Banks 514 510 515 515 515 515 515 515 513
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Appendix D: Evolution of financial ratios of commerzbank. Deutsche bank and unicredit
Commerzbank
Dates ROAA ROAE TA EQTA NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000 0.343 11.031 4.54E+08 3.027 48.398 58.757 209.1227451 0.18289486
2001 0.033 1.169 5.01E+08 2.616 42.886 56.186 189.3426004 0.170063846
2002 −0.058 −2.322 4.22E+08 2.387 33.958 49.31 155.2058516 0.151071101
2003 −0.555 −21.881 3.81E+08 2.702 34.898 45.003 138.561 0.146703927
2004 0.11 4.154 4.25E+08 2.594 34.121 53.155 143.0337699 0.126497206
2005 0.292 10.303 4.45E+08 3.068 33.38 51.816 149.4214651 0.126142018
2006 0.34 12.348 6.08E+08 2.517 47.194 39.991 208.5281913 0.114334257
2007 0.314 12.244 6.16E+08 2.617 45.98 37.85 181.8044187 0.116455123
2008 0.01 0.328 6.25E+08 3.174 45.554 26.979 170.4717308 0.117079866
2009 −0.631 −19.962 8.44E+08 3.148 39.07 38.647 137.2705633 0.115324916
2010 0.186 5.392 7.54E+08 3.799 39.479 44.374 125.4087207 0.115670001
2011 0.106 2.795 6.62E+08 3.748 40.882 40.661 122.5953728 0.121037441
2012 0.009 0.219 6.36E+08 4.127 38.461 45.139 107.85266 0.118601954
2013 0.029 0.647 5.5E+08 4.9 39.562 44.946 98.88542269 0.137432324
2014 0.067 1.379 5.58E+08 4.842 37.681 41.381 94.30941156 0.148201942
Statistics ROAA ROAE TA EQTA EQNL NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2012
Mean 0.20 2.52 9576120.05 8.21 14.72 59.42 13.73 207.06 5.60
Quartile 1 0.10 1.32 498175.00 6.96 11.04 51.27 7.61 68.81 3.51
Median 0.17 2.12 1343700.00 7.97 13.16 61.07 11.24 85.18 5.13
Quartile3 0.26 3.27 2592700.00 9.09 16.46 68.45 18.25 100.72 6.72
Std. 0.18 1.84 117752917.45 2.02 6.20 13.71 9.16 2762.92 3.49
Min. −0.09 −1.57 24354.50 3.22 6.30 0.89 1.67 1.60 0.00
Max. 2.57 13.73 2414261000.00 23.89 70.74 94.01 57.72 62600.00 45.44
Banks 511 511 512 512 511 512 512 512 510
2013
Mean 0.19 2.17 9337735.55 8.69 15.32 60.38 13.06 192.28 5.60
Quartile 1 0.10 1.21 511750.00 7.43 11.50 52.38 6.58 70.56 3.54
Median 0.16 1.90 1384000.00 8.44 13.86 62.68 10.94 85.29 5.18
Quartile3 0.25 2.91 2697900.00 9.68 17.06 69.26 16.94 101.00 7.05
Std. 0.17 1.37 111815846.88 2.04 6.31 13.87 9.25 2420.33 2.92
Min. 0.00 0.00 25411.80 3.20 6.29 1.02 1.38 1.82 0.51
Max. 2.84 7.89 2252689000.00 24.08 71.67 95.59 60.59 54579.69 25.23
Banks 506 506 507 507 506 507 507 507 505
2014
Mean 0.18 2.06 8462092.54 9.18 15.76 60.71 12.91 223.79 5.81
Quartile 1 0.10 1.13 659350.00 7.75 12.08 52.52 6.12 68.95 3.89
Median 0.17 1.82 1510100.00 8.85 14.51 62.65 10.33 84.67 5.28
Quartile3 0.24 2.68 3056700.00 10.07 17.25 70.39 16.78 99.76 7.06
Std. 0.12 1.37 115635873.86 3.96 6.43 13.85 10.33 2705.79 3.01
Min. 0.00 0.00 26865.50 3.90 7.48 0.39 1.25 10.13 0.86
Max. 0.99 13.13 2240721000 75.92 72.08 90.84 99.28 52479.45 24.68
Banks 372 373 375 375 374 375 375 375 373
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Unicredit
Dates ROAA ROAE TA EQTA NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2000 0.201 6.678 694267000 3.137 59.241 38.859 209.707 0.14186
2001 0.137 3.873 716241000 3.932 58.54 45.432 251.357 0.13893
2002 −0.137 −4.24 526452000 2.266 57.609 34.814 214.294 0.16264
2003 −0.489 −19.758 473167000 2.703 57.655 35.796 202.385 0.16087
2004 −0.454 −15.969 467385000 2.99 56.033 36.242 190.581 0.15585
2005 0.216 7.058 493659000 3.122 53.134 40.468 173.469 0.16865
2006 1.038 29.379 508033000 3.934 32.287 63.591 178.026 0.14083
2007 1.261 26.672 422129000 5.685 37.961 83.707 152.779 0.16919
2008 −0.147 −2.76 458602000 5.02 36.388 75.186 167.555 0.16633
2009 0.215 3.789 363420000 6.504 39.884 69.518 158.957 0.17358
2010 0.47 7.305 371909000 6.364 37.339 70.099 146.317 0.18458
2011 0.261 4.133 372312000 6.263 35.141 64.074 137.792 0.13630
2012 0.358 5.525 347285000 6.7 35.063 62.53 124.281 0.13863
2013 0.337 4.851 290018000 7.244 37.572 63.721 115.084 0.16469
2014 0.325 4.605 300342000 6.858 36.268 62.04 120.220 0.17407
Deutsche bank
Dates ROAA ROAE TA EQTA NLTA LACUST TLCDT OFFBAL
2006 0.387 18.439 1571768000 2.098 11.534 98.536 44.41707 0.09710
2007 0.399 19.293 1925003000 2.042 10.332 92.497 43.80364 0.05713
2008 −0.189 −10.939 2202423000 1.449 12.227 92.028 68.56704 0.04011
2009 0.268 14.189 1500664000 2.53 17.199 96.914 75.95375 0.09433
2010 0.137 5.274 1905630000 2.644 21.396 81.557 77.13564 0.09970
2011 0.213 8.236 2164103000 2.526 19.062 81.614 69.24634 0.08524
2012 0.015 0.58 2022275000 2.682 19.65 81.541 69.65732 0.08918
2013 0.037 1.247 1611400000 3.411 23.365 79.246 72.39905 0.10661
2014 0.102 2.638 1708703000 4.285 23.741 69.595 77.09872 0.11247
